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When Can a State Agency
Use a Child's Social Security Benefits
to Pay for Foster Care Expenses?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 135-139. © 2002 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law at
Marquette University Law School
in Milwaukee, Wis.; (414) 2885377 or jgrenig@earthlink.net
and a co-author of West's Federal
Jury Practiceand Instructions
(5th edition).

ISSUE
Does an agency that has been
appointed as a representative payee
to receive benefits on behalf of a
beneficiary violate the Social
Security Act when the agency uses
the benefits to pay for the beneficiary's current care?
FACTS
Foster care in the State of
Washington is provided to children
who have been abused or neglected
or have become the responsibility of
the state. Washington provides foster care through the Washington
State Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS), using a
combination of federal, state, and
private funds, although the program
is largely state-funded. To be eligible
for federal funding under the Social
Security Act, a state must provide
foster case services under a plan
approved by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services.
It is the policy of the DSHS to
attempt to recover the costs of foster care from the children's parents.

If the parents of a foster child are
unavailable or unwilling to reimburse DSHS for the costs of foster
care, state law provides that DSHS
may reimburse itself using other
funds that come into its possession
while the child is in its custody.
When a child is eligible for Social
Security benefits, federal law provides a process by which a "representative payee" may be appointed
to receive and administer the funds
on behalf of the child. A representative payee is generally appointed
whenever a beneficiary is under the
age of 18. The Social Security
Administration (Administration) will
appoint an authorized agency only if
no parent or guardian is available to
serve as representative payee. The
appointment of a state agency like
DSHS as a child's representative
payee is last on the Administration's
priority list.
(Continued on Page 136)

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT
OF SocIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES
ET AL. V GUARDIANSHIP ESTATE OF

DANNY KEFFELER ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 01-1420
ARGUMENT DATE:

DECEMBER 3, 2002
FROM: SUPREME COURT OF
EASHINGTON

s eligible
rity beneprovides
which a

e payee
nted to
receive and ad minister
the funds on be half of the
child. This case presents
the issue of w hether a
state agency tthat has
been designat ted as a
child's repres entative
payee violated f,ederal law
1h nh1(1'

4

4"

L

Representative payees must use
Social Security benefits for the beneficiary and in the beneficiary's best
interest. The Administration's regulations specifically authorize a representative payee to use Social
Security Benefits to defray the cost
of the beneficiary's "current maintenance," including food, shelter,
clothing, medical care, and personal
items.
When monthly benefits exceed the
amount needed for current maintenance, the regulations require the
representative payee to conserve
and invest the remaining benefits in
trust for the benefit of the beneficiary. Large amounts of retroactive
benefits must be placed in a
separate, dedicated account and
used only for certain, enumerated
expenditures.
In September 1999, 1,480 foster
care children were in the custody of
DSHS and receiving Social Security
benefits. DSHS acted as the representative payee for 1,411 of those
children. When DSHS receives
Social Security benefits as representative payee for a foster child, the
funds are deposited in the Foster
Care Trust Fund Account at the
Office of the Washington State
Treasurer. Although the funds are
kept in a single account, the Trust
Fund Union maintains an individual
"subsidiary account" for each child
for whom benefits are received.
The Children's Administration
(Children's) unit of DSHS provides
services to all foster children regardless of whether the children also
receive Social Security benefits.
Children's is responsible for providing the current maintenance needed
by a child in foster care. It does not
normally purchase a child's food,
shelter, clothing, and other items
directly; such items are purchased
and provided by the child's foster
parent. Children's pays the foster

parent a fixed amount based on a
schedule. Where a special item or
expenditure is needed, the Trust
Fund Unit will issue a check to
either the foster parent or directly
to a store or service provider. Such
expenditures are authorized by
DSHS in its discretion as the representative payee.
The Trust Fund Unit typically uses a
child's Social Security benefits to
pay for a child's basic foster care
expenses. As a representative payee,
DSHS has the discretion to spend a
child's Social Security benefits on
items other than current basic foster care expenses. Children in foster
care for whom a person or entity
other that DSHS serves as representative payee still receive state-supported foster care. Foster children
who do not receive Social Security
benefits are eligible for state funding
for extra items and special needs if
funds are available in the state foster care budget.
In 1996, a class action was filed
against DSHS on behalf of all foster
children within the State of
Washington, past, present, and
future, who receive Social Security
benefits and for whom the State of
Washington acts or has sought to
act as representative payee. The
plaintiffs asked that DSHS be found
to have violated the provision of the
Social Security Act that forbids
creditors access to Social Security
benefits. They contended that
DSHS, as representative payee, used
the foster children's Social Security
Benefits to reimburse the state for
the costs of foster care.
The trial court held that DSHS's use
of Social Security Benefits to reimburse the cost of foster care violates
federal law. On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court held
that DSHS, as a representative payee, violated the Social Security Act
when it applied Social Security ben-
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efits to the current maintenance
needs of foster children for whom it
acted as representative payee. 145
Wash.2d 1, 32 P.3d 267 (2001). The
Washington court observed that
DSHS receives reimbursement for
foster care only if it serves as a representative payee and concluded
that it only serves as a representative payee so that it can confiscate
the child's money.
Relying on a Social Security regulation providing that the "primary
concern is to select the payee who
will best serve the beneficiary's
interests," the court stated:
Obviously the child is better off
with any payee other than the
state because DSHS must provide foster care under state law
regardless of whether it
receives a reimbursement.
DSHS's self-prioritization is
extremely disquieting in the
face of a regulatory mandate
that we consider these disenfranchised children before
enriching government coffers. '
GuardianshipEstate of Keffeler v.
State Department of Social and
Health Services, 145 Wash.2d 1, 17,
32 P.3d 267, 275 (2001) (italics in
original, footnotes omitted).
The court concluded that under 42
U.S.C. § 4050) a representative payee may not be a "creditor of such
individual who provides such individual with goods and services for
consideration."
The United States Supreme Court
thereafter granted DSHS's petition
requesting review of the Washington
Supreme Court's decision. 122 S.Ct.
2288 (2002).
CASE ANALYSIS
A provision of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. § 407(a)) prohibits
creditor access to Social Security
benefits. Thus if DSHS acted as a

Issue No. 3

creditor when it reimbursed itself
for foster care costs out of the foster
children's Social Security entitlements, it would have violated the
Act's anti-attachment provisions.
Social Security regulations also provide that it is the responsibility of
the representative payee to "[ulse
the payments he or she receives
only for the use and benefit of the
beneficiary in a manner and for the
purposes he or she determines ... to
be in the best interests of the beneficiary." 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a).
The regulations permit use of Social
Security benefits for the current
maintenance of the beneficiary. 20
C.F.R. § 404.2040(a)(1).
In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare
Bd., 40 U.S. 413 (1973), the U.S.
Supreme Court declared that
Section 407(a) barred New Jersey's
attempt to reach federal Social
Security benefits in order to reimburse itself for the public assistance
expenditures it made on behalf of
the petitioners. State welfare recipients had been made to execute an
agreement, as a condition precedent
to receiving welfare benefits, to
reimburse the county welfare board
with any funds that came into their
possession. The Court stated, "We
see no reason why a State, performing its statutory duty to take care of
the need, should be in a preferred
position as compared with any other creditor."
Section 407(a) was again before the
Supreme Court in Bennett v.
Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
Arkansas had attempted to attach
certain federal benefits paid to individuals incarcerated in Arkansas
prisons to reimburse the state for
maintaining the prison system.
Arkansas argued that there is an
"implied exception" to the bar of
Section 407(a) when the state is
providing public money for the care
and maintenance of Social Security

beneficiaries. The Court found no
such "care and maintenance"
exception for states given the
express language of Section 407(a).
DSHS contends that the Social
Security Act and regulations
expressly authorize it, acting as representative payee, to use benefits
for the beneficiary's current maintenance. It also argues that Section
407 does not bar a representative
payee from using benefits to pay for
current maintenance. DSHS claims
that, instead of violating Section
407(a), its use of Social Security
benefits actually implements a carefully crafted federal statutory plan
to appoint responsible representative payees for needy children and
ensure that benefits are properly
used.
According to DSHS, it is illogical to
conclude that Section 407(a) prohibits what Section 4050) and the
regulations permit. DSHS explains
that Section 407(a) protects benefits from execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process by a person who is not a
representative payee. When a representative payee is appointed, DSHS
says that it becomes the duty of the
Commissioner of Social Security to
ensure that the payee is using the
benefits properly.
DSHS also argues that the Washington Supreme Court's decision is
inconsistent with the Commissioner
of Social Security's interpretation of
the Social Security regulations.
According to DSHS, the Commissioner has consistently taken the
position that payments made for
current maintenance are permissible under its regulations, even when
that maintenance would otherwise
be provided by the state at no
charge to the beneficiary.
DSHS distinguishes the Supreme
Court's decision in Bennett from the

present case, asserting that, unlike
the present case, Bennett involved a
court action by a state seeking to
attach Social Security benefits
under a state statute authorizing the
state to seize a prisoner's property
or estate to help defray the cost of
maintaining the prison system. It
also distinguishes Philpott, explaining that the Supreme Court applied
Section 407(a) to bar a state lawsuit
from reaching the Social Security
benefits in an individual bank
account under an agreement to
reimburse.
Finally, DSHS contends that as a
representative payee it did not act
as a creditor when it used the Social
Security benefits to pay for a foster
child's care. Acknowledging that
Section 407(a) prevents DSHS from
bringing suit to compel a private
representative payee to pay for a
beneficiary's current care, DSHS
asserts that if a private payee refuses to use the Social Security benefits to pay for current care, the
Commissioner of Social Security
has an obligation to remove that
payee and choose an alternate payee who will make proper use of the
benefits. DSHS notes that this
action is seldom necessary since
private payees pay Social Security
benefits to the state to help offset
the cost of care.
The respondents, on the other
hand, assert that Section 4050)
requires DSHS to act in the beneficiaries' best interest and prohibits
self-dealing. They claim that DSHS's
cost-recovery program cannot be
justified as a use of the benefits by a
representative payee for "current
maintenance." Respondents stress
that DSHS uses the benefits to reimburse for past care and services and
to repay programmatic expenses.
Respondents also claim that DSHS
has been "double dipping"-reimbursing itself for costs already paid
(Continued on Page 138)
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from federal funds or already reimbursed by the child's parent.
According to respondents, DSHS is
barred by state law from using the
discretion required of a representative payee. They say that a proper
administration of benefits would
require DSHS to consider the child's
current and future needs before
contemplating reimbursement.
It is respondents' position that
Washington's statutes and regulations compelling the use of respondents' Social Security benefits to
reimburse foster care costs amount
to a "legal process" forbidden by
Section 407(a). Respondents declare
that DSHS violates 407(a) when it
assigns their Social Security benefits
to reduce the cost of providing foster care in Washington.
Respondents argue that the regulations relied upon by DSHS address
the direct payment of current maintenance costs, not reimbursement,
and definitely not a state-mandated
cost-recovery program. In addition,
respondents declare that the regulations instruct that even the direct
payment of such costs is not authorized unless it is in the best interest
of the beneficiary.
SIGNIFICANCE
The circuit courts have applied
Section 407(a) in various situations.
The Seventh Circuit in Mason v.
Sybinski, 280 F.3d 788 (7th Cir.
2002), held that a payee's use of
benefits to pay for the current maintenance of beneficiaries in a state
hospital did not violate Section
407(a) because "no attachment or
legal process took place."
The Eighth Circuit upheld a practice in Missouri where the state, as
representative payee, received the
Social Security benefits due involuntarily committed mental patients
and reimbursed itself for the care

and maintenance costs it had
expended for the patients out of
public funds. King v. Schafer, 940
F2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Crytes v. Schafer,
502 U.S. 1095 (1992). The court
explained "that the Department's
participation in the administrative
representative payee is [not] the
kind of coercive legal action envisioned by Section 407(a). See also
C.G.A. v. Alaska, 824 P.2d 1364
(Alaska 1992); Ecolono v. Division
of Reimbursements, 769 A.2d 296
(Md. App. 2001).
In Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263
(9th Cir. 1989), however, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that DSHS may not
deduct Social Security benefits as
reimbursement for the costs of care
and maintenance paid out of public
funds for involuntarily committed
mental health patients in state hospitals. Another case, Crawford v.
Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
1995), involved a California law
requiring patients committed to
state psychiatric hospitals to be
responsible for the costs of their
own incarceration. California
required that all funds and income,
including Social Security benefits to
which the patient was entitled, be
placed in a hospital trust account
from which the state could deduct
as reimbursement the costs of care
and maintenance expended on the
patient. The Ninth Circuit held that
Section 407(a) preempted the
California procedure, stating that
Section 407(a) is designed "to protect social security beneficiaries and
their dependents from the claims of
creditors."
The financial impact of this case is
readily apparent from the fact that
DSHS forecasted it would receive
$6.733 million from Social Security
reimbursement, or a full 18 percent
of the state's contribution to the foster care budget of $37 million for
fiscal year 2000. Upholding the

Washington Supreme Court's decision could have an adverse impact
on the availability of services for
needy children. Other states that
follow procedures comparable to
those used by DSHS would be similarly affected. Some have suggested
that children are at risk of losing
critical state and federal benefits if
their Social Security benefits are
allowed to accrue.
On the other hand, children in foster care are less than 1 percent of
the total population receiving Social
Security benefits. A decision
upholding DSHS's actions could
affect millions of older Americans
receiving Social Security benefits as
well as foster children and other
children receiving Social Security
benefits. Some of these persons
could face indigency if their benefits
are used to reimburse government
agencies.
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